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     This paper expands upon previous research that analyzed the tactics minority party 
members of Congress use to get their policies considered or oppose the majority party 
agenda. The paper evaluates various minority party strategies and their effectiveness. 
Effectiveness of a strategy is defined by the success of the minority party in achieving its 
legislative goals after implementing a tactic (i.e. a majority party sponsored bill not 
receiving enough votes to pass the chamber).  
     I analyze persuasion, compromise, and obstruction as three strategies minority party 
members use. Minority party members employ obstruction when they take steps to block 
the movement of majority party bills through the legislative process. In contrast, minority 
party members compromise when they work with members of the majority party to 
develop legislation using various mechanisms such as cosponsorship. Lastly, minority 
party members persuade when they convince legislators in the majority to do something 
they would have not originally considered. I also analyze the impacts of various factors 
from seniority to ideology on a legislator’s ability to employ these strategies successfully.  
     This paper takes into account modern political polarization that has created new 
conditions for the minority party to navigate and fewer opportunities for compromise on 
substantial issues. The data analysis provides insight into the characteristics that are 
associated with more effective legislators and attempts to explain those results. This 
paper offers a new perspective on the way minority party members as a unit can represent 
the interests of their constituents and the most effective ways to ensure their concerns are 
addressed as legislation moves throughout the chamber. 
Keywords: legislative process, Congress, minority party, strategy, majority party, policy  
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     On February 7, 2018, House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi gave an eight-hour speech 
on the chamber floor. The speech was the longest delivered on the House floor since 
1909 and some have cited that it was the longest ever delivered in the chamber (Detrow 
2018).  Her speech was in protest of the stalling negotiations regarding the Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which is set to expire on March 5, 2018 
(O’Keefe et al. 2018). President Obama signed an executive order that created the DACA 
program in 2012, but in September of 2017 President Trump said he would rescind the 
policy while allowing Congress to take up the issue (Lillis et al. 2017). Leader Pelosi’s 
speech reflected the frustrations of many House Democrats who want to help 
DREAMERs (Detrow 2018). However, they also lost significant leverage on the debate 
after agreeing to vote for a budget deal in January 2018 that did not address the issue 
(Detrow 2018). The Democrats voted for the budget to end a government shutdown 
(Detrow 2018). Unlike the Senate, the House of Representatives does not have a 
filibuster procedure that allows the minority party or any member to obstruct the business 
of the chamber. In giving her speech, Leader Pelosi took advantage of a unique rule that 
allows party leaders in the House to speak as long as they want (O’Keefe et al 2018).  
Her decision is reflective of a changing climate in Congress in which the minority party 
has to come up with unique strategies that allow them to engage in the legislative process 
when normal bipartisanship no longer works.  
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     The circumstances surrounding Leader Pelosi’s speech represent a growing partisan 
polarization in Congress that results in members of both parties being unwilling to work 
together to legislate. In this case, the minority party wanted the guarantee that the DACA 
issue would be considered in the chamber—a promise Senate Majority Leader Mitch 
McConnell had given to Senate Democrats earlier in the year (Detrow 2018). House 
Speaker Paul Ryan said he intended to allow debate on the immigration bill proposed by 
President Trump. However, he did not specify a date nor time (O’Keefe et al. 2018). 
Without debate on the bill, the minority party (Democrats) would not have the chance to 
offer amendments or express their opinions about what should be included in a revised 
immigration bill in the formal legislative process, leaving few other avenues to share their 
thoughts.  
    Scholars have studied how the minority party has used various procedural powers such 
as plenary time, the filibuster, and voting to stop or support legislation (Jenkins, Monroe, 
and Provins 2014; Straus 2016; Green 2010). The results of these studies demonstrate the 
effectiveness of those individual strategies while also considering how broader features 
of the congressional environment impact policymaking. These studies provide an in-
depth analysis of the various mechanisms members of the minority use to impact 
legislation and create opportunities for future research on the overall effectiveness of 
these various powers or tools.  
     This study evaluates minority party legislative strategies and their effectiveness. The 
broad research question focuses on the way members of the minority party can overcome 
the limitations on their powers in the legislative process. The majority party is guaranteed 
many procedural and informal powers, but there are still strategies the minority party can 
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employ to influence the bills on the legislative agenda. A strategy is defined as effective 
here if it helps the minority party achieve its intended goals: to prevent a specific bill 
from becoming law, to get a bill party members proposed considered on the chamber 
agenda, or get minority party ideas included in majority party sponsored legislation. 
However, there are situations in which some strategies may work better than others. The 
purpose of this study is to compare the results of different strategies House and Senate 
minority party members employ and identify which are more effective. 
     I expect to find that the success of a strategy depends on the situation in which it is 
used and who employs it. For example, a minority party member who has served in 
Congress longer may be more effective at employing persuasion due to their knowledge 
of the chamber procedures. In contrast, a more ideologically extreme legislator may be 
less effective because they struggle to work across the aisle to develop compromises.  
     The thesis is organized as follows. I start by discussing previous research about the 
sources of power available to the minority party and the results of using these various 
powers to influence the legislative process. In this section, I also define the three 
strategies considered here and identify the situations in which they are most commonly 
employed. Then I discuss the quantitative analysis including the hypotheses, data 
description, and results from the regression models testing the effectiveness of House 
members. The hypotheses examine the impact of various characteristics of House 
legislators such as seniority or committee membership on their ability to effectively 
employ persuasion. I test them by examining changes in the overall effectiveness of 
legislators based on those different factors. In the next section, I introduce and discuss the 
qualitative analysis I conducted to analyze the strategies minority party Senators employ 
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to help them engage in the legislative process. I selected two case studies that represent 
situations in which Senators employed two key strategies and analyze the many factors 
surrounding those situations that may have contributed to the observed results. Lastly, I 
include a final discussion of the strategies analyzed throughout the study and propose 
areas of future research on this topic.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
     Effectiveness of parties and legislators is an important subject in political science 
research. Many studies have been conducted about the sources of power available to the 
minority party specifically and advantages its members have in the legislative process. 
The minority party is of particular interest because its members have few guaranteed 
procedural powers to engage in policymaking. Clark (2015) argues that in discussions of 
constitutional designs a critical question is often “how to achieve a system that empowers 
the majority to carry out the public will while maintaining the rights of the minority”. 
Therefore, studying the minority party in Congress allows scholars to better understand 
the role and powers of the party’s members in a legislative system where it is more 
difficult to pursue policymaking from the minority.  
     Scholars have studied plenary time as a resource for the minority party to get their 
own legislation passed while Congress is in session (Jenkins et al. 2014, 7). Plenary time 
is the time Congress has to process legislation. It is limited in both chambers, but it is 
also a key resource for the majority in controlling the legislative agenda. Jenkins et al. 
(2014) shows that it may be better for the minority party to pursue amendments with their 
time rather than trying to get a whole bill through the process because it does not take as 
long to consider an amendment (15). However, many of the amendments the minority 
proposed with their plenary time did not get passed and there was often a party line vote 
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(Jenkins et al. 2014, 16).  Therefore, use of plenary time may not be an effective strategy 
for the minority party to pursue in an effort to achieve its legislative goals.   
      Jones (1970) studied minority party activities that facilitate or impede majority 
building in Congress as part of the policymaking process. This scholarship recognizes 
that minority party behavior varies over time depending on multiple political conditions 
including “…constitutional arrangements, political circumstances inside and outside of 
Congress, and the nature of specific issues” (Jones 1970, 4). However, the study focused 
only on domestic policy and since the focus was on Congresses in the 20th century the 
Republican Party was the minority for most of the time (Jones 1970, 5). Therefore, the 
study does not examine in detail the way the Democratic Party used various strategies 
when its members were in the minority. More importantly, there is increased political 
polarization in the modern day Congresses creating new political conditions not 
considered in the previous scholarship. A Pew Research poll found from 1973 to 1974 
there was substantial overlap between Republican and Democrat votes on a liberal to 
conservative ideological scale. There were 240 House members and 29 Senators whose 
votes signaled a more moderate ideology whereas from 2011 to 2012 there were none, 
which is representative of the expanding polarization in Congress (Desilver 2014).  
     In a study of the legislative effectiveness of individual lawmakers, scholars have 
focused on the factors that impact the success of legislators in getting their policies 
moved through the legislative process. Volden and Wiseman (2009) developed an 
effectiveness score for legislators based on their ability to move significant bills through 
committees and the House. The study suggests that there are three components a 
legislator needs to become effective in the House including “innate ability, the 
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acquisition and cultivation of a critical skill set, and the sophisticated utilization of key 
legislative institutions” (Volden and Wiseman 2009, 6). This research provides insight 
into how to measure effectiveness of legislators in Congress that can be translated to 
understand the most effective strategies the minority party members as a whole can use to 
achieve their goals.  
     Three broad strategies available to the minority party emerge from previous research 
and specific powers guaranteed by the lawmaking process. These strategies are 
obstruction, compromise, and persuasion. There are various mechanisms to employ each 
of these strategies that have been used throughout congressional history with varying 
degrees of success.  
     The current political conditions in which there are fewer moderates in either 
congressional chamber and the parties are moving farther a part ideologically provides a 
new set of circumstances to evaluate these commonly used strategies. Is compromise an 
option when it seems there are few issues for which both parties agree on the solution? 
Does obstruction contribute to labels such as the “do nothing Congress” that have 
become more common during the last few sessions (Blake 2016)? Previous research has 
attempted to address these questions and discussed the mechanisms used to employ the 
strategies identified in this study.  
    The minority party obstructs when they refuse to work with the majority party on 
legislation and take steps to prevent the majority from moving items they support through 
the legislative process. In 2010, just a few days before the midterm elections former-
Speaker John Boehner said he and his Republican colleagues would do everything they 
could to “kill it, stop it, slow it down…” referring to President Obama and the 
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Democrats’ agenda (Barr 2010). This comment illustrates the modern use of obstruction, 
which has been employed by political parties since Congress was formed. There are 
various ways in which the minority can actively oppose the efforts of the majority to pass 
legislation. The most basic mechanism to employ obstruction is to vote against a certain 
bill or procedural motion. However, in many cases the minority does not have enough 
members to make a significant difference through voting, especially when the majority is 
united. Therefore, they may instead not show up to the chamber when it is in session 
denying the quorum needed, hold a protest or filibuster in the chamber, offer 
amendments, etc. to keep a bill from moving forward.  
     Obstruction can be effective if the minority takes well-planned action and uses the 
strategy in specific situations. Straus (2016) presents a new perspective on the 
effectiveness of obstruction with regard to efforts by Republicans in 2010 to drag out 
several Democratic initiatives. “The Republicans’ obstruction was even more effective 
against legislation that was not worth the opportunity cost of overcoming a filibuster” 
(Straus 2016, 224). Therefore, the importance of an issue or bill to the majority can 
impact the minority party’s success in attempting to obstruct the legislative process. 
Strand et al. (2013) also acknowledge that in many cases the only resource the minority 
has to defend the interests of its constituents is to obstruct: “If a minority has no ability to 
participate in the legislative process, its only power is to obstruct the minority through 
dilatory, sometimes uncivil tactics. A minority has no choice but to be negative” (Strand 
et al. 2013, 262).  
     Wawro (2005) argues that there is a difference between simply voting against a bill 
and actual obstruction. Although the study focuses on the antebellum period of the 
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Senate, the basic ideas are in many ways applicable today. Wawro (2005) discusses the 
pros/cons of obstruction in reference to the “other activities the legislator must forgo 
while obstructing and missed opportunities to pass other legislation” (166). Therefore, by 
obstructing the work of the majority the minority is also taking up time that could 
possibly be used to consider legislation that it prefers or in response the majority could 
ram through its agenda because there is less time in the congressional session. Green 
(2010) also found that obstruction is one of the most risky strategies because it can make 
“…the minority look excessively obstructionist, by leading the majority to retaliate by 
further limiting the minority’s rights, and so on…” (24).        
   Although obstruction is a strategy available to the minority, there are drawbacks to 
employing this tactic especially in the eyes of the public. A common theme in studies 
about the goals of the minority party in Congress is that its main goal is to get back in the 
majority (Jenkins, Monroe, and Provins 2014; Jones 1970). The party in the majority of 
each chamber does not switch every election cycle, but in a political climate where 
legislators are participating in the never-ending campaign they must consider public 
perceptions when they employ various strategies (House of Representatives and Senate 
Archives). Jones (2014) examined whether the minority is held accountable for what 
happens in Congress and if there are any incentives for them to behave more responsibly 
in their response to majority party actions. The results showed “that perceptions of an 
overly partisan Congress negatively affect public evaluations of both congressional 
parties” (Jones 2014, 480). Therefore, in regard to the partisan environment of Congress, 
constituents do put some of the responsibility for the gridlock on the minority party as 
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well. This suggests that it is important for the minority to carefully consider how the 
public views their actions and whether the strategy they use has external support.  
      One example of a situation in which the minority party used obstruction was during 
the July 2017 Affordable Care Act (ACA) debate in the Senate. The Democrats voted as 
a bloc against Republican efforts to repeal and replace the ACA. Although the 
Republicans only needed 51 votes to send the bill to Conference, the few Republican no 
votes and the Democratic voting bloc ensured the bill would not move forward at that 
time. A Congressional Budget Office report showed that millions of people would lose 
their insurance coverage under the Republican repeal proposals (Pear and Kaplan 2017). 
Some Americans protested the Republican bill and were concerned about its possible 
affects on their lives (Elperin, Sullivan and O'Keefe 2017). In this example, the 
Democratic opposition was somewhat successful due to some public support and lack of 
unity among the majority party as three Republican Senators voted against the motion to 
proceed on “the skinny repeal” (Parlapiano et al. 2017). According to a compilation of 
polls tracking opinions on healthcare by PollingReport, “on average 55 percent of 
Americans opposed the GOP proposals to replace Obamacare while 22 percent supported 
them” (Guskin and Clement 2017). However, this is not always the case and the minority 
party can pay for being too obstructionist, especially on substantive issues that the public 
believes need to be addressed. In this case repealing and replacing the ACA has been an 
important issue for Republicans and the Senate majority proposed a new bill later in 2017 
for which Democratic obstruction may or may not work.  
     Obstruction can be a good strategy for the minority to prevent the majority party from 
successfully moving its bills through the chamber process. It may be better in cases when 
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the minority and majority party strongly disagree on a specific policy, but in other 
situations the minority may choose to compromise. Minority party members may 
cosponsor legislation with the majority or offer to work with them to develop 
comprehensive legislation that will benefit constituents of both parties.  
     Compromise is a strategy that represents bipartisanship. Recent scholarship has 
discussed the various ways in which the minority party can work with the majority and 
develop effective compromises, specifically in the House. The minority party can impact 
the content of legislation if the majority does not have enough members to pass 
legislation on its own (Green 2010, 28). Jones (1968) extended this point in a reference to 
the role of House Republicans in the 63rd Congress: “Only if the Democrats were 
seriously split on some issue could the Republicans expect to play a significant role” 
(486). There are some conditions in which the majority party is not unified or has a slim 
majority that provide the minority party with additional sources of power to play an 
active role in the legislative process. However, as Jones (1970) mentions the issue being 
considered also influences the impact of the minority party. Therefore, even if the 
majority is experiencing intraparty divisions that does not mean they will automatically 
turn to the minority to accomplish their party goals, especially when it comes to more 
partisan bills. 
     There are some conditions that influence how successful the minority will be and 
when they will use compromise as a strategy. Generally, the minority compromises as a 
way to get their ideas included and concerns addressed in legislation that the majority 
party proposes. Straus (2016) finds that the minority is more likely to pursue compromise 
with the majority when it would be harmful to the minority party members’ reputation to 
 12 
obstruct or the consequences of not addressing the issue would be detrimental to the 
country (225).  
     However, compromise as a strategy for both the minority and majority has been used 
less often in more recent Congresses. One factor that has inhibited the use of compromise 
on more substantial issues that divide members across party lines is the decreasing 
amount of moderates in Congress (Desilver 2014). Binder (1999) finds that the amount of 
moderate legislators serving in Congress is key because they can move compromises 
forward and are more likely to get bills passed into law (521). The study by Binder 
(1999) also finds that policy change happens less often as the political parties grow 
farther apart ideologically and there are less moderate legislators (527). Moderate 
members are often more willing to cross party lines to find solutions and develop policies 
that will get support from both parties.  
     As the parties spread farther apart on the ideological spectrum they sacrifice more by 
coming together, especially on major partisan issues. This has been a common issue for 
Republican legislators following the Tea Party wave during the midterm elections in 
2010. The Tea Party movement brought more extreme members into the Republican 
Party who “made a special point of targeting Republicans who compromised with 
Democrats or even with Republican leaders” (Rauch 2016). As a result, many moderate 
Republicans lost their reelection bid because of their more extreme primary opponent 
who appealed to voters.  In an op-ed piece, Congressman John Yarmuth discussed the 
drawbacks for a politician who tries to work across the aisle, “Pity the politician, liberal 
or conservative, who suggests a compromise, because compromise is tantamount to 
treason” (Yarmuth 2017).  
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     In spite of the fact that there are fewer moderates in Congress, scholars who studied 
individual legislators have pointed to one factor that can help further minority party 
efforts to compromise or introduce legislation. A key result from the study was that 
seniority plays a major role in the effectiveness of a legislator; a senior member of the 
minority party can be as effective as the average majority party representative who has 
less experience in the chamber (Volden and Wiseman 2009, 27). As Jones (1970) 
mentioned regarding the climate of the Senate, the prestige of a member can increase 
their ability to participate in the development of legislation even if they are in the 
minority party. This research shows that individual members in the minority may be able 
to further the interests of the party simply because of their seniority or expertise in the 
chamber procedures. However, Volden and Wiseman (2009) do not consider how the 
placement of a legislator on the ideological spectrum impacts the effectiveness of a 
member even if they have seniority (i.e. will someone who is more extreme be as 
effective?). 
     Although partisan polarization has lessened opportunities and agents available for 
compromise, there are general situations in which compromise may not be an option in 
any political environment. On hotly contested or controversial topics, it may be less 
effective for the minority party to try to compromise since it is less likely the majority 
will actually want to work with them. Therefore, compromise is a strategy the minority 
party will most likely use on issues of importance that Congress must address quickly or 
in cases where the majority may be more welcoming of their involvement.  
     The last strategy analyzed in this study that is available to the minority party is 
persuasion. In some ways persuasion is similar to compromise because both parties are 
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working together in an effort to pursue their policy goals. However, the difference is that 
when the minority party persuades, they are not simply trying to convince the majority 
party to accept ideas they have proposed in majority legislation or to cosponsor bills. 
Instead, persuasion is a strategy in which an exchange is made between the parties or in 
general the minority convinces the majority to do something they would have not 
originally considered. For example, minority party members may offer to not obstruct a 
majority party bill in exchange for getting a bill they have proposed on the legislative 
agenda with a vote held. Persuasion is the strategy used in this case because the minority 
party is not signaling support for the majority party bill—an element of bipartisanship—
but rather the minority is simply deciding not to oppose it and in exchange the party’s 
own bills will be guaranteed a position on the legislative agenda. Also the majority party 
may still choose not to support the minority party bill. Therefore, this is not an example 
of compromise because members of both parties will not ultimately work together to pass 
one piece of legislation, but they will pursue their individual party goals through separate 
bills.  
     Obstruction itself may be a mechanism to employ persuasion and get the majority to 
accept bills proposed by the minority. For example, some House Democrats staged a sit-
in on the chamber floor in 2016 and refused to move until the Republican majority agreed 
to hold a vote on the “no fly, no buy bill” (Bade et al. 2016). The bill was a gun control 
measure that would prevent terror suspects whose names appeared on the “no –fly” list 
from purchasing guns (Bade et al. 2016). In this case, the Democrats hoped that by 
keeping the chamber from continuing its daily business through the use of a sit-in they 
could convince the Republicans to hold a vote on the bill. The protest ended 
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unsuccessfully 25 hours after it began as the Republicans refused to allow a vote and 
eventually adjourned the chamber for the Fourth of July recess (Demirjian et al. 2016). 
This example shows how minority party members may use obstruction to pressure or 
persuade the majority to accept their bills.  
    Another way to employ persuasion is to simply propose amendments that members of 
the majority may accept. This mechanism may be most successful when the amendment 
is written in a way that provides a solution members of the majority have previously 
supported. For example, Representative Barbara Lee offered an amendment that would 
limit unrequested Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funding during the House 
markup of the Republican budget in 2017 (Amendment XVI). Many conservative 
Republicans have been critical of OCO spending for years (Bennett 2015). Two members 
of the majority voted in favor of the amendment putting it three votes away from being 
included in the final budget bill that would have been voted out of committee. Although 
the strategy did not work here as the amendment was ultimately rejected, this example 
provides another illustration of situations in which persuasion can be employed.  
     In general, persuasion may also be used when the bill being considered is important to 
the majority providing the minority party with leverage. As mentioned earlier, 
obstruction by the minority may work when the bill is not a priority for the majority and 
they do not want to spend time overcoming minority opposition. On the other hand, when 
the majority is committed to getting a certain policy signed into law they may be willing 
to consider minority party bills. Persuasion may also be an effective strategy when bills 
or amendments that the minority party opposes are also opposed by members of the 
majority.  
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     Obstruction, compromise, and persuasion are all strategies that the minority party can 
employ using various mechanisms to achieve their legislative goals. Scholars have looked 
specifically at factors that may dictate when the minority party is more likely to employ 
one strategy over another. Egar (2015) argues that “a minority party [that is] optimistic 
about the likely results of the next election should be more likely to choose conflict, 
while a minority party that expects the status quo (or worse) should choose compromise” 
(77). The study’s results showed that while compromising could provide legislative 
victories for the minority party, it could also increase positive views of the majority party 
who may reap the benefits of legislative progress (Egar 2015). “Opposing the other party 
provides a more credible basis for campaigning against them in the next election” (Egar 
2015, 79). Although Egar (2015) provides a strong argument for pursuing more 
obstructionist tactics against the majority because constituents do hold the minority party 
somewhat responsible for political gridlock, employing obstruction can create problems 
for them in the next election. The study does not take into account what the minority 
should do when the president is of the same party, which is an external factor that can 
influence the legislative process. It also focuses on the House of Representatives, not 
considering the best strategy for the minority in the Senate.        
     Overall many scholars have studied the unique disadvantages the minority party in 
Congress faces and the strategies members of the minority can use to ensure their policies 
are considered or policies they disagree with are not passed into law. However, there are 
opportunities to further examine the sources of power available to the minority that are 







     This section analyzes the effectiveness of persuasion as a strategy employed by House 
minority party members. In order to measure the use of persuasion, I consider six 
hypotheses to identify the impact of various factors on the ability of a House legislator to 
move their bills through the chamber. These hypotheses test characteristics of legislators 
including their seniority and ideological position in the chamber that may effect their 
ability to successfully employ persuasion and get their individual bills accepted by a 
majority of the chamber (including by majority party members). The hypotheses are as 
follows:  
     1. A minority party representative who is either on the appropriations, ways and 
means, rules or budget committee will be more effective than their party colleagues who 
are not on any of these committees. The members on those committees have significant 
influence over the money the government spends, where the money goes, and the rules 
for considering legislation. Committee members also are able to pursue their own policy 
interests through special instructions in the bills often referred to as policy riders and by 
using the process to propose amendments they support. Membership on these committees 
gives lawmakers influence over the legislative process in ways unavailable to their 
colleagues not on the committees. As a result of these circumstances, I expect that 
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minority party representatives on these committees will be more effective at moving their 
bills through the House than other members of the party.   
     2. A minority party representative who has previous experience serving in a state 
legislature will be more effective than party representatives who have not served in a 
state legislature. Volden and Wiseman (2009) found that “legislators come to the 
chamber with a certain set of skills” and those who are able to apply these skills early on 
continue to be effective during their tenure in the chamber. In some cases, this set of 
skills that allows members to navigate the legislative process and politics of government 
can begin to be developed through experience in a state legislature. Therefore, I expect to 
see that minority party members with previous experience in a state legislature will be 
more effective because they would have had the opportunity to cultivate key 
policymaking skills.  
     3. Minority party members who are identified as Southern Democrats will be more 
effective than other members. The Southern Democrats were socially conservative, but 
liberal in their economic policy preferences. In this case, Southern Democrats are defined 
as Democratic representatives from the 11 states of the Confederacy along with 
Oklahoma and Kentucky. They did not fit ideologically within either the Democratic or 
Republican parties at the time, which allowed them to form coalitions with each party 
based on the policy being considered. Conley (2001) found that President Truman had 
difficulty pursuing his policy goals and vetoing bills he did not support because of the 
union of Republicans and Southern Democrats. This is just one example in which the 
Southern Democrats used their unique position to their advantage. They were also 
possibly able to convince the Democrats or Republicans to include some of their 
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proposals in exchange for votes on that party’s legislation. The ability to form coalitions 
with both parties put the Southern Democrats in a position to employ persuasion and I 
expect it made those members more effective in moving their bills through the legislative 
process.  
     4. Minority party members in House leadership positions (minority leader, whip, etc.) 
will be more effective than members not in leadership positions. Party leaders have a 
unique role that allows them to influence the party platform and encourage members of 
the party to support certain initiatives. They also have the ability to negotiate on behalf of 
the party with the majority leadership about the chamber legislative agenda. I expect that 
minority party leadership members will be more effective because of their special 
position that allows them to influence their colleagues and navigate the chamber.  
     5. Minority party representatives with seniority will be more effective at employing 
persuasion than legislators who have served less time in the chamber. Senior House 
lawmakers often have learned the institutional procedures of the chamber in their years of 
service. They also may have developed skills over time that allow them to navigate the 
multiple obstacles in the legislative process, which their more junior peers may not have 
at their disposal. I expect that senior minority party members will be more effective at 
employing persuasion than their counterparts because they have experience and 
knowledge of the chamber that puts them at an advantage to achieve their policy goals.   
     6. Minority party members who are closer to the median of the chamber will be more 
effective than members who are farther on the ideological extremes of the chamber.  
Previous studies have shown that there are increasingly fewer moderate legislators 
serving the House and that policy change is less common when this occurs (Desilver 
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2014; Binder 1999). These findings suggest that moderate legislators may be more likely 
to work across the aisle and get a majority of legislators to support certain policies. I 
expect that moderate members of the minority party will more be effective because they 
have a less polarizing ideological position and may be able to convince legislators in the 
majority party to accept their policy proposals.  
 
Description of Data 
     This study will use the Legislative Effectiveness Project data set (Volden and 
Wiseman 2009; Volden and Wiseman 2014). The data provides legislative effectiveness 
scores for all members in the House of Representatives from the 93rd to the 110th 
Congresses. These effectiveness scores are based on the ability of legislators to move 
bills they sponsor through each stage of the legislative process (action in committee, 
action beyond committee, passed the House, and passed into law).  
     The bills are put into categories based on their impact on policy: commemorative, 
substantive, and substantively significant bills. Volden and Wiseman (2009) define 
commemorative bills as those that provide “for a renaming, commemoration, private 
relief of an individual, and the like” (9). These bills are often specific to the district of a 
representative, while substantive and substantively significant bills attempt to change 
policy for the whole country so they are more difficult to move through the process. In 
developing the effectiveness scores, this dataset provides different weight to bills that a 
member gets moved through the stages of policymaking with substantively significant 
bills contributing the most to the score. The researchers also give more weight to 
legislators whose bills make it further through the chamber such as bills that pass the 
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House or even become law because of the increased difficulty in achieving those results.     
The dependent variable for every hypothesis in this section will be LES. 
     I supplemented the data set by adding the DW-NOMINATE scores for every member 
as a measure of their ideology (Poole and Rosenthal 2011). The DW-NOMINATE scale 
provides a score for members of Congress based on their roll call votes aligning them 
based on the two dimensions of the ideological spectrum (liberal/conservative and issue 
based). This data will be used to test the hypothesis regarding the possible impact of a 
member’s ideological position in the chamber on their ability to effectively employ 
persuasion.  
 
Figure 1: Legislative Effectiveness Variable Frequencies 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 
Variable Description Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Power Member of 
Appropriation, Rules, or 
Ways and Means 
0 1 .25 .434 
Budget Member of Budget 0 1 .08 .275 
State Legislator Served in a state 
legislature 
0 1 .49 .500 
Southern 
Democrat 
Southern Democrat (11 
Southern States along 
with Oklahoma and 
Kentucky) 





0 1 .02 .131 
Seniority Number of terms served 
counting current 
1 27 5.21 3.964 
Median Legislator Absolute distance from 
floor median 
.000 1.68 .353 .223 
 
     In order to test changes in effectiveness of minority party members based on their 
membership on the more powerful chamber committees, this study will use the variables 
Power (membership on the appropriations, rules, and ways and means committee) and 
Budget (membership on the budget committee). The variable State legislator identifies 
whether or not a representative previously served in a state legislature. This variable will 
be used to test a possible change in effectiveness for members who had previous 
legislative experience on the state level. The variable Southern Democrat takes a value of 
one representing someone who can be identified as a Southern Democrat and zero for 
representatives who were not Southern Democrats. In order to test the hypothesis that 
being in leadership positions makes members more effective, the variable Minority 
leadership will be used which identifies members of the minority party who hold 
leadership positions in the House including the minority leader, whip, etc. The variable 
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Seniority identifies the number of terms a legislator has served in the House. Lastly, 
Median Legislator is a score for the absolute distance of a House member from the floor 
median. This variable will be used to test how changes in a legislator’s ideological 
position in the chamber will impact their ability to effectively employ persuasion. 
Results 
     The hypotheses focus on changes in the legislative effectiveness of minority party 
members as a result of different factors. I conducted a linear regression to test possible 
shifts in legislative effectiveness for minority party legislators only. For some of the 
independent variables, the direction of change they cause in a representative’s legislative 
effectiveness is different than predicted. Many of the independent variables are 
statistically significant and have a statistically meaningful relationship with the dependent 
variable. In this study, the magnitude for each relationship is described in terms of the 
change in the typical legislator’s effectiveness score percentile based on the specific 
independent variable being tested.1 The analysis below first focuses on the relationships 







                                                        
1 The typical legislator for the regression analysis that only includes data for minority 
party members is not on the budget or power committees, is in the 54th percentile for the 
chamber median, is not a Southern Democrat or in the minority party leadership, has 
served in a state legislature and served in the House for about five terms. 
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Note: Statistical Significance: p < 0.05*, p < 0.01** 
 
     Based on the model, the variables power, median legislator, Southern Democrat, and 
seniority are all statistically significant. For minority party members on power 
committees, there is a negative impact on their legislative effectiveness overall. The 
typical legislator who is not on any of these committees has a legislative effectiveness 
score in about the 51st percentile. Legislators who serve on those committees land in 
about the 45th legislative effectiveness percentile. Therefore, service on any of these 
committees is associated with a five-percentile point decrease in effectiveness.  
     The median legislator variable identifies a member of the House’s ideological position 
within the whole chamber and their absolute distance from the chamber median. This 
model shows that as a legislator moves farther away ideologically from the median of the 
chamber there is a decrease in their overall legislative effectiveness. The average 
legislator is about .353 points away from the most moderate member of the House or at 
Table 2: The Legislative Effectiveness of 
Minority Party Representatives, 93rd to 
110th Congress 
 

































the 54th percentile for ideological scores (Table 1). I calculated the percentile change in 
legislative effectiveness based on the average legislator position compared to other 
legislators that were at the 35th ideological percentile with a score of .221. The results 
showed that being about 20 percentile points closer to the chamber median improves the 
legislative effectiveness percentile of a member by 15 points.  
    According to the model, there is a negative relationship between the Southern 
Democrat variable and legislative effectiveness (Table 2). This means that a legislator 
who is a Southern Democrat will actually have a lower effectiveness score than someone 
who does not fit in that category based on the district they represent or party affiliation. 
The typical legislator who is not a Southern Democrat has an effectiveness score in about 
the 51st percentile. However, the typical legislator who is a Southern Democrat has a 
score in about the 44th percentile. These results show that there is a seven-point percentile 
decrease in effectiveness for legislators who are Southern Democrats.  
     The last statistically significant variable is seniority, which refers to the number of 
terms a legislator has served in the House chamber. There is a positive relationship 
between seniority and legislative effectiveness, which means in general a legislator’s 
effectiveness score goes up the longer he/or she serves in the chamber. According to the 
dataset, the average number of terms House members have served is 5.21 or a little over 
10 years. I calculated two different comparisons for this relationship in order to show the 
more pronounced changes in legislative effectiveness the longer a person has served in 
the chamber. The first comparison measures the difference in legislative effectiveness for 
a typical legislator who has served two terms compared to someone who has served six 
terms. A legislator who has served for two terms has an average effectiveness score in the 
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46th percentile whereas someone who has served for six terms has an average score in the 
51st percentile, which is a five-percentage point increase. This improvement in the typical 
legislator’s effectiveness score is greater when comparing a person who has served for 
two terms compared to 10 terms. There is a 10-point increase in the legislators’ 
effectiveness score percentile that was associated with their additional eight terms of 
service.   
     The variables minority leadership, budget, and state legislator have a statistically 
insignificant relationship with the dependent variable legislative effectiveness. In this 
model, the variables budget and minority leadership do have p-values that are close to 
.05, but it can still be assumed that there is not a statistically meaningful relationship 
present (Table 2). The statistical insignificance of these relationships does not support the 
hypotheses related to those variables.  
     The results from the model support some of the hypotheses presented while 
countering others. Although I expected that membership on power committees would 
improve representatives’ effectiveness, the model shows that it leads to a decrease in their 
ability to persuade their colleagues to accept the bills they sponsor. There are various 
explanations for this result. One possible explanation is the rules created by the 
Democratic Caucus and Republican Conference about the committees that members can 
serve on consecutively. For example, Democrats who serve on “exclusive committees”–
Appropriations, Rules, Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, or Financial Services— 
cannot serve on any other committee except for Budget or House Administration 
(Schneider 2014,1). Although the Republican Conference does not have this rule, 
Republicans in the House who want to serve on the Rules Committee must take a “leave 
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with seniority” from one of the other standing committees on which they serve 
(Schneider 2014,1). Therefore, the representatives serving on the powerful committees 
identified in this study are not able to directly engage with the policymaking of other 
issue areas such as agriculture or education at the committee level. Instead, they must rely 
on their colleagues who serve on those committees to consider their bills and move them 
through the process exercising influence from afar.  
     As predicted in the hypotheses, there is an increase in legislative effectiveness for 
lawmakers who have previously served in state legislatures. Previous research has shown 
that there are certain skills lawmakers bring with them to the Congress that can allow 
them to be more effective at achieving their policy goals (Volden and Wiseman 2009). 
This provides one explanation for the result that lawmakers who served in the state 
legislature have learned how to navigate a legislative process and bring those skills to the 
House. Jones (1970) finds that a Senator’s prestige or expertise with institutional 
procedures is something that may allow him/or her to play a more active role in and 
influence the legislative process. Although those findings referenced the Senate 
specifically, it is possible that this same logic could be applied to the House and provides 
another explanation for the increased effectiveness of representatives who previously 
served in their state legislature. They have institutional experience at some level, which 
their colleagues who have never served in a legislature do not have and it may give them 
an advantage.  
     Contrary to expectations, members who were identified as Southern Democrats were 
less effective compared to their colleagues. The results in the model suggest that being 
able to form coalitions with Republicans and Democrats on various issues did not 
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necessarily improve the ability of Southern Democrats to move their own bills through 
the chamber. Volden and Wiseman (2014) mention there were possible limits to the 
coalition building of the Southern Democrats because by supporting Republican 
initiatives they could have been considered as disloyal to the broader Democratic Party, 
“resulting in their proposals being dismissed along with those of minority party 
Republicans” (9). This idea could explain as the majority party is less likely to consider 
the bills of the minority party and if the Southern Democrats were grouped with the 
Republicans then it could hurt their legislative effectiveness overall. Another possible 
explanation for the results is the idea that there may be consequences for minority party 
members or any other legislator that obstructs the majority legislative agenda. Wawro 
(2005) mentions that Senators have to consider the fact that they may lose opportunities 
to pass legislation they support by obstructing the majority. By forming coalitions with 
the Republicans in the minority to possibly block Democratic sponsored legislation the 
Southern Democrats were taking up time to pursue their own bills along with hurting 
their relationship with the Democratic Party as a whole. In addition, there have been 
fewer members of Congress who can be identified as Southern Democrats—socially 
conservative and economically liberal—over the years. Today there are no Democratic 
members of Congress who represent that ideology from the South, but rather most of the 
Democrats represent majority-minority districts and are more socially liberal, as well as, 
economically liberal (Cohn 2014).  These factors combined could also explain the 
decrease in legislative effectiveness for House lawmakers who fit into the category of 
Southern Democrats based on their district and party.      
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     The model provides support for the hypothesis that members who are closer to the 
median of the chamber will be more effective than those farther away ideologically from 
the most moderate member. As a member moves away from the chamber median 
ideologically, their legislative effectiveness score decreases. Binder (1999) found that 
there is less policy change in the chamber as a whole when there are fewer moderate 
members because they help facilitate compromise across party lines (527). The results 
from the model show that this idea may also apply on the individual level. In general, 
moderate legislators are more successful at employing various strategies to get support 
for the bills they sponsor and moving those bills through the legislative process with them 
possibly becoming law. However, it is difficult to show that moderate ideology alone 
contributes to the legislative effectiveness of lawmakers.  
    Lastly, the model demonstrates senior legislators will be more effective at moving their 
bills through the chamber process than other legislators who have served in the House for 
a shorter amount of time. Volden and Wiseman (2009) found that seniority plays a major 
role in a legislator’s effectiveness and a senior member of the minority party can be as 
effective as the average representative of the majority party with less experience in the 
chamber (27). The results from this model reinforce the findings from that study and also 
show that the minority party members who have served in the chamber for a longer 
amount of time are more effective.  
     In order to compare these findings about the effectiveness of minority party members 
when employing persuasion to the majority, a similar multiple regression model was used 
to examine how the same factors impact majority party members’ effectiveness.  
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Table 3: The Legislative Effectiveness of Majority Party 
Representatives, 93rd to 110th Congress 
 
 
Note: Statistical Significance: p < 0.05*, p < 0.01** 
 
    The model shows that there is a different impact of the independent variables on 
legislative effectiveness for majority party members. This regression model includes all 
of the same variables from the minority party model except for minority party leadership, 
as it does not apply to majority party members.2 According to the model, there was a 
statistically significant relationship between the independent variables power, budget, 
Southern Democrat, seniority and legislative effectiveness. The relationships between 
median legislator, state legislator, and legislative effectiveness were not statistically 
significant.  
     According to the model, there is a negative relationship between the variable power 
and legislative effectiveness. The typical legislator who does not serve on that category of 
                                                        
2 The typical legislator used in this model was not a member of the budget or power 
committees, had a median ideological score of .353, was not a Southern Democrat, had 
served in a state legislature and served in the House for about five terms. 





























committees has an effectiveness score in about the 84th percentile. However, the 
effectiveness score for the legislators who do serve on those committees is in about the 
73rd percentile. Therefore, membership on power committees actually decreases a 
legislator’s effectiveness by about 10 percentile points.  
     Also the variable budget has a negative relationship with legislative effectiveness, but 
it is weaker than the impact of being on a power committee. There is only about a two-
percentile point decrease in effectiveness for a legislator who is on the House Budget 
Committee compared to someone who is not. House Budget Committee members who 
are in the majority party have an effectiveness score in the about 81st percentile. In 
contrast, legislators who are not on the committee have an effectiveness score in about 
the 83rd percentile. This suggests that membership on the budget committee does not have 
a strong impact on a legislator’s overall effectiveness and only makes them a little less 
successful in achieving their legislative goals.  
     Based on the model, there is also a negative relationship between representatives who 
are identified as Southern Democrats and legislative effectiveness. The typical House 
members who were Southern Democrats had an effectiveness score in the 77th percentile 
whereas those who did not fit into this category had a score in about the 83rd percentile. 
This shows that being a Southern Democrat decreases a legislator’s effectiveness by 
about six percentile points.  
     Lastly, there is a positive relationship between longer service in the chamber and 
legislative effectiveness. I again calculated two different comparisons to illustrate the 
changes in effectiveness based on an increase in seniority. First, the typical legislator who 
has served for two terms is less effective than their counterpart who has been in the 
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chamber for six terms. The legislator who served two terms had an effectiveness score in 
about the 70th percentile compared to the 85th percentile for the six-term representative— 
a 15-point percentile increase. This positive relationship is more pronounced when 
comparing the effectiveness of the typical legislator who served two terms compared to 
someone who served 10 terms. There is a 22-point percentile increase in effectiveness 
that coincides with an additional 8 terms or 16 years of service.  
     The variables state and median legislator were not statistically significant in this 
regression model. This suggests that there was not a statistically meaningful relationship 
between those variables and the legislative effectiveness of representatives.  
     In total, I conducted three regression models to analyze the relationship between the 
various independent variables and legislative effectiveness for minority party members 
only, majority party members only, and then all legislators in the dataset.  
    The third regression model included the variable majority that puts legislators into two 
categories: minority party member (0) or majority party (1), as well as, all the other 
variables in previous models. As a result, the typical legislator in is somewhat different 
and the model includes all of the cases in the data set. 3 This model offers a new 
perspective on the relationship between party membership and legislative effectiveness. 
The typical legislator for this model who was in the majority party had an effectiveness 
score in the 82nd percentile. In contrast, the typical minority party legislator’s 
effectiveness score put them in about the 61st percentile. There was a more than 20 
percentile point difference in effectiveness for members based on party, which is less 
                                                        
3 The typical legislator was a member of the majority party, not in minority party 
leadership, not on a power or the budget committee, not a Southern Democrat, had a 
median legislator score of .353, previously served in a state legislature, and served in the 
House chamber for an average of five years. 
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than the 33 percentile point contrast between the models separating the cases into 
majority party only and minority party only. By controlling for other variables such as 
seniority and ideology, the model shows the impact that party membership has on 
legislative effectiveness for all lawmakers may be lessened by other factors. 
 
Note: Statistical Significance: p < 0.05*, p < 0.01** 
 
     Below is a comparative analysis of the models that identifies differences in results 
such as changes in legislative effectiveness scores by party. 
    One interesting contrast in the models is the legislative effectiveness percentile for the 
typical legislator. The typical member analyzed for each model was generally the same. 
In the case of the regression model for minority party members only, the typical legislator 
had an effectiveness score that was in the 51st percentile (Table 2). In contrast, the typical 
Table 4: The Legislative Effectiveness of 
House Legislators, 93rd to 110th Congress 
 





































legislator for the majority party only model had an effectiveness score in about the 84th 
percentile (Table 3). There is a 33-percentile difference for members of the majority 
compared to the minority party. This gap in the effectiveness percentile for the typical 
legislator is in many ways reflective of the difference in powers available to members of 
the majority party compared to the minority. The additional powers available to majority 
party members allow them to in general more easily move their bills through the chamber 
although there are some majority party legislators who are less effective.  
     Some of the relationships that were statistically significant for the minority party only 
regression model were statistically insignificant for the majority party model and vice 
versa. One example is the variable budget that is statistically significant in the majority 
party model and insignificant for the minority party model. This change in statistical 
significance suggests that there is a difference in the impact of each independent variable 
on effectiveness depending on the specific cases being tested.  
    Also in general for all of the relationships tested the starting effectiveness percentile 
was much lower for the model focused on minority party members only than the other 
two models. The typical legislator in the minority party only model who served on a 
power committee had an effectiveness score in the 45th percentile (Table 2). In 
comparison, the typical legislator who was on a power committee in the majority party 
model had an effectiveness score in the 73rd percentile (Table 3). Lastly, the typical 
legislators who served on the power committees in the third regression model were in the 













     Previous research has provided a basis for predicting when the minority party will 
employ various tactics. However, in practice the minority party does not always pursue 
the expected strategies as a result of conditions surrounding a particular bill. For 
example, there are cases in which the minority could have effectively employed 
obstruction to block majority party legislation but the members instead chose to 
compromise. I will analyze two Senate case studies in this section to test the effectiveness 
of obstruction and compromise as strategies the minority party can employ. These case 
studies also provide a glimpse into the unique circumstances that lead the minority party 
to employ compromise over obstruction or vice versa. This analysis will illustrate the 
way the minority party uses each strategy and attempt to explain what factors contributed 
to the results after a tactic was employed.  
     The minority party employs obstruction when they refuse to work with the majority 
party on legislation and take steps to prevent the majority from moving items they 
support through the legislative process. If obstruction is an effective strategy to achieve 
the goals of the minority party, I expect that:  
1. The minority party will successfully use procedural powers (i.e. filibuster and votes) to 
stop majority party legislation from moving through the chamber.  
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2.  The minority party will take steps to delay bills that are legislative priorities for the 
majority party. Although this study does not assume the actions of the minority party are 
motivated only by electoral concerns, the possibility of regaining the majority does in 
some way influence the decisions of the minority. This hypothesis acknowledges the 
connection between the ability to move certain bills through the chamber and electoral 
gains. Especially during election years, it is important for the majority to show they have 
fulfilled their legislative promises (Weisberg and Patterson 1998, 125). Therefore, the 
minority party may use obstruction specifically on bills that are priorities for the majority 
party to prevent them from achieving a legislative victory that can lead to electoral 
benefits.  
3. The minority party will use procedural powers to stop majority party legislation when 
their own bills and amendments are not being considered in the chamber.  As previously 
mentioned, when the minority party’s proposals are not being considered in the chamber 
they may have “no choice but to be negative” (Strand et al. 2013, 262). 
     Compromise is a strategy used when the minority party works with the majority to 
develop policies with bipartisan language. If compromise is an effective strategy to 
achieve the minority party goals, I expect that:  
1. The minority party members will cosponsor legislation with majority party members or 
offer amendments that are accepted into legislation. 
2. Moderate senators in the minority party will be more likely to engage in compromise 
negotiations than senators on the ends of the ideological spectrum.  
3. Senior senators will be more likely to engage in compromise negotiations than junior 
or freshman senators.  
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4. The minority party will work with majority party members on bills that address a 
widespread public issue.   
     The two case studies that will be used to test these hypotheses are described below. 
There is a case study for a bill proposed with a Republican minority and another under a 
Republican majority.  
 
Data Description  
Case Study 1: Senate Bill 1177- Every Student Succeeds Act  
      Republican Senator Lamar Alexander, who was chair of the Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions, proposed the Every Student Succeeds Act in July of 
2015. The bill was intended to make changes to No Child Left Behind (NCLB)—a key 
initiative passed in 2002 during the Bush administration. NCLB “amplified Washington’s 
role in U.S. classrooms and launched a national system that judged schools based on 
math and reading test scores and required them to raise scores every year or face 
escalating penalties” (Layton 2015). Over time the accountability system based on testing 
in NCLB became unpopular and was seen by some as unrealistic (Layton 2015). 
President Obama signed the Every Student Succeeds Act into law in December of 2015 
about five months after Senator Alexander introduced it. He praised the bill and called it 
a “Christmas miracle” because it was one of few key bipartisan pieces of legislation 
passed at the time (Layton 2015).  
     The Every Student Succeeds Act provides a unique case study to analyze persuasion 
and compromise as strategies the minority party can employ to influence legislation. One 
interesting point about this law is that the process of developing it in the Senate was led 
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mainly by Senator Alexander and Senator Murray who represented their parties as the 
chair and ranking member for the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. 
In every stage of the process they not only considered their personal policy goals, but also 
were the spokespeople for their respective parties (Layton 2015).  
      This bill illustrates the strategy of persuasion because Senator Alexander had not 
planned to write the bill with the interests of Democrats in mind and actually expected it 
to pass on a party line vote hopefully pulling a few Democratic votes to reach a majority 
(Layton 2015). However, Senator Murray convinced Alexander to allow her to work with 
him in writing the bill and to make it a true piece of bipartisan legislation. The Every 
Student Succeeds Act also provides an example of compromise because Senators 
Alexander and Murray had to consider the concerns of each other and members of the 
other party when writing the legislation. Senator Murray admitted that the bill was not 
something she or the Democrats would have written on their own and she assumed the 
same for the Republicans, but instead the bill was a combination of ideas from both 
parties (Wong 2015).  
 
Case Study 2: Senate Bill 3364- Bring Jobs Home Act 
     Democrat Senator Debbie Stabenow sponsored the Bring Jobs Home Act in July of 
2012 for the second time during the 112th Congress. Stabenow previously sponsored the 
bill in May of 2012, but it was referred to the Senate Finance Committee and never 
moved out of the committee. According to the Congressional Record, the Bring Jobs 
Home Act proposed to amend the Internal Revenue Code to create a new tax credit for 
businesses that relocated their production back to the United States. If passed, the bill 
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would also deny businesses the tax deduction for expenses incurred by outsourcing. The 
Bring Jobs Home Act was the top priority on President Obama’s congressional to-do list 
before the election later in 2012 (Barrett 2012). There were 15 Democrat senators who 
cosponsored the Bring Jobs Home Act.  
     When Senator Stabenow introduced the Bring Jobs Home Act for the second time it 
was not referred to the committee, but instead the Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid put 
the bill on the legislative calendar. The bill failed after a cloture vote on the motion to 
proceed did not receive the 60 votes needed to move the bill forward. Only four 
Republicans voted for the cloture vote and the rest of them voted against it with only one 
Republican abstaining.  
     The Bring Jobs Home Act provides an interesting case study to analyze how the 
Republican Party, the minority in the Senate at the time, used obstruction to prevent this 
key Democratic Party priority from getting through the chamber. Egar (2015) argues that 
compromising with the majority and giving them key legislative victories does not 
necessarily benefit the minority electorally. He states, “Opposing the other party provides 
a more credible basis for campaigning against them in the next election” (Egar 2015, 79). 
In this case, comments from the Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell and other 
Republican senators suggest this idea played a role in their obstruction of the Bring Jobs 
Home Act. Republican Senator Orrin Hatch said, “On the surface this might sound 
reasonable ... but as far as tax policy goes this is a joke” (Cox 2012).  
     Overall, the Bring Jobs Home Act offers a key example of a case in which the 
minority party obstructed the actions and legislative priorities of the majority 
successfully. Many factors contributed to the ability of the Republicans to successfully 
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oppose and stop the Bring Jobs Home Act from becoming law. This case study also 
provides opportunities to analyze the reasons why the Republicans may have chosen 




Case Study 1: Every Student Succeeds Act 
     Republican Senator Lamar Alexander introduced Senate Bill 1177 also known as the 
Every Student Succeeds Act in April of 2015. The goal of No Child Left Behind was to 
make all United States students proficient in reading and math by 2013, but schools that 
did not achieve the metrics or comply with the regulations laid out in the law were 
penalized financially (Tatter 2016). President Obama created a system where states that 
were struggling to meet the standards set in NCLB could get waivers from parts of the 
law. The Department of Education issued waivers to those failing states, but they were 
required in exchange to adopt standards that focused on career and college readiness 
(Tatter 2016). However, the waivers did not solve the problems created by NCLB 
(Severns 2015).  
     In an interview with Education Week, Senator Alexander said he introduced the Every 
Student Succeeds Act because by that point everyone wanted a change. “By the time we 
got to 2015, almost everybody except the U.S. Department of Education wanted it fixed. 
Governors, teachers' unions, chief state school officers ... it was a law that everybody 
wanted fixed” (Klein 2016). The Every Student Succeeds Act gives a lot of power back 
to states to regulate their education systems. This change was a response to the way the 
U.S. Department of Education handled waivers for states who could not meet the 
requirements of NCLB. Senator Alexander said, “the department was in effect acting as a 
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national school board for the 42 states with waivers —So it was important to get the balls 
back in the hands of the people who really should have it” (Tatter, 2016).  
     The Republican conference elected Senator Alexander to chair the Health, Education, 
Labor and Pensions (HELP) committee in January of 2015 during his second term. 
Senator Alexander had held previous roles as the governor of Tennessee, U.S. Education 
Secretary under President George W. Bush, and President of the University of Tennessee. 
He served in Senate Republican Leadership for five years, but then resigned because “he 
wanted to focus on bridging divides rather than scoring political points” (Layton 2015).  
     According to the HELP committee website, Senator Alexander’s top priority when he 
assumed the chairmanship was to fix NCLB. The Senator talked briefly with other 
Senators including Democrats about his draft of the Every Student Succeeds Act and 
details that should go in it (Klein 2016). However, the bill Senator Alexander planned to 
introduce was stacked with Republican priorities, which concerned Democrats (Severns 
2015).  
     Democratic Senator Patty Murray, ranking member of the HELP committee, 
encouraged Senator Alexander to pursue a bipartisan process for writing the Every 
Student Succeeds Act (Klein 2016). Senator Murray was in her fourth term as a U.S. 
Senator at the time and had held various positions in the Democratic Party Senate 
Leadership. She was the first woman to chair the Senate Budget Committee. As Senate 
Budget Committee Chair, Senator Murray negotiated the Bipartisan Budget Act, a two-
year budget deal, with Representative Paul Ryan (R-WI) and was becoming known as a 
key dealmaker (Layton 2015). Senator Murray also served in the Washington State 
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Senate, the Board of Directors for the Shoreline School District and was a preschool 
teacher.   
     Like Senator Alexander, Senator Murray was concerned about the problems that 
NCLB created and wanted to help reform the law. Senator Murray represents Washington 
state in the Senate, which was one of the first states to lose its wavier from NCLB. The 
specific situation in her state was not the only factor that motivated her to pursue a 
bipartisan process to fix NCLB (Klein 2016). She said “schools around the country, not 
just in Washington weren't benefiting under the ‘one size fits all mandates’ of NCLB. We 
were in a terrible quandary where everyone hated the law" (Klein 2016). Murray was also 
worried that if the law was not rewritten in 2015 it would be a while before there was 
significant momentum to fix it again (Klein 2016).  
     However, Senator Alexander’s idea of a bipartisan process meant he would propose 
his original bill and then within the HELP committee members of both parties would be 
able to offer amendments (Klein 2016). Senator Murray felt there was no way to 
successfully craft a bill to fix the problems in the U.S. education system that would get 
bipartisan support if the process started with the bill Senator Alexander originally 
proposed (Layton 2015). After both Senators met to discuss the appropriate way to 
approach reforming NCLB, they agreed to start from scratch. They decided to 
compromise and move past the partisanship that plagued Congress (Layton 2015). “The 
only way to slice through that dysfunction, she [Murray] said, is to start with a ‘document 
at the outset that both of us said we could support and live with and work from’” (Layton 
2015).  
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     Former Republican Senator Trent Lott  (R-MS) commented on the role of Senators 
Murray and Alexander within their parties and generally as legislators. He said “‘Lamar 
is probably one of the best Republicans that I know, he knows how to make things work 
in the Senate,’ and ‘…for the Democrats, I conclude that Patty Murray is probably their 
best legislator’” (Layton 2015). These comments illustrate unique characteristics of 
Senators Alexander and Murray that may have played a role in their ability to work 
together and negotiate the Every Student Succeeds Act.  
     Many of the debates over how to reform NCLB between Republican and Democrat 
lawmakers focused on the role of the federal government along with providing a system 
of accountability to ensure students received a quality education (Layton 2015). The 
Republicans called for more autonomy to be given to states and school districts, whereas 
the Democrats wanted to ensure there would not be disparities in access to good 
education across state or district lines (Huetteman 2015). Senator Alexander considered 
limiting the federal government’s role in state education and the education secretary’s 
power along with possibly giving “states block granted federal funds that could be 
converted into school vouchers” when he wrote his original bill (Severns 2015).  
     Both senators had to consider the concerns of each other and members of their 
respective parties when writing the legislation. Senator Murray also was a voice for the 
Obama Administration in the process. According to a discussion Senator Alexander 
recalled having with President Obama, the president requested that there be “annual 
testing, an early-childhood education program, and a focus on turning around the lowest 
5 percent of schools” in the Every Student Succeeds Act (Klein 2016). 
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     Both Senators worked together to negotiate between all of those interests and find a 
balance that a majority of the chamber would accept if the bill made it to the floor. One 
area where Senator Alexander and Murray struggled to find an agreement was on 
creating a program that provided preschool for low-income children. The issue was very 
important to Senator Murray and was also a priority for the Obama Administration 
(Layton 2015). However, many Republicans opposed creating the program because they 
did not want to expand the federal government’s role in education (Layton 2015). In 
order to prevent this issue from derailing the whole piece of legislation, Senator 
Alexander recommended that Senator Murray negotiate the program with Senator Johnny 
Isakson (R-GA) who was also on the HELP committee and if Isakson agreed then 
Alexander said he could also accept it (Layton 2015). Senators Murray and Isakson were 
able to write an amendment that created competitive grants for states that would help 
them coordinate early childhood programs at multiple levels (Layton 2015). They 
proposed the amendment when the Every Student Succeeds Act was brought to HELP 
committee for consideration.  
     Senators Alexander and Murray brought the bill before the full HELP committee in 
April of 2015. They persuaded other members on the committee to save their more 
controversial amendments for the debate in the full Senate chamber (Layton 2015). The 
purpose was to make sure the bill could at least make it out of the committee (Layton 
2015). This approach led to the bill being reported out of committee with unanimous 
consent (Congressional Record). After a series of debates on the Senate floor and 
discussion of various proposed amendments, the Every Student Succeeds Act passed the 
chamber on an 81 to 17 vote with bipartisan support. There were 39 Republicans and 40 
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Democrats who voted for the bill along with two Independent senators. However, there 
were 14 Republicans and three Democrats who voted against the bill with two other 
Senators abstaining.  
      The piece of legislation that was signed into law with ideas from the House as well 
included a combination of Republican and Democrat priorities. States were still held 
accountable for the success of their schools, but they were allowed to develop their own 
methods for judging the quality of the schools (Layton 2015). Also the states were still 
required to test students annually in math and reading, but they could decide how to deal 
with the schools whose test scores were in the lowest five percent (Layton 2015). As 
proposed in Senator Alexander’s draft of the bill, under the Every Student Succeeds Act 
the education secretary will have less legal authority and is prohibited from influencing 




     In this case study, the minority party used a combination of compromise and 
persuasion as strategies to achieve its legislative goals. Senator Patty Murray’s ability to 
successfully persuade Senator Alexander to pursue a true bipartisan process and rewrite 
the Every Student Succeeds Act was essential for the minority party to also employ 
compromise. This example shows that it may be necessary to combine various tactics in 
order for the minority party to obtain optimal results in the legislative process. By 
convincing Senator Alexander to work with her, Senator Murray was able to ensure the 
resulting piece of legislation included specific Democratic proposals instead of hoping 
that amendments Democratic Senators proposed would be agreed to.  
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     Following the initial use of persuasion, Senator Murray and the other Democratic 
Senators effectively compromised with their Republican colleagues to pass a bipartisan 
bill that included many of their proposals. In this example, the Democrats did not follow 
the traditional process of cosponsoring legislation, as it is normally understood. There 
were no cosponsors for the Every Student Succeeds Act that Senator Alexander 
proposed. When a Senator cosponsors a bill it is formal way to show they support a piece 
of legislation but that does not necessarily mean they contributed to the specific language 
of the bill. Therefore, the absence of cosponsors for the Every Student Succeeds Act does 
not mean compromise was not effectively employed. Senators Alexander and Murray 
worked together with their staff members to write the bill, which is also a way to 
compromise without formally cosponsoring legislation.  
     Democrats also compromised in this case by offering amendments. They offered 115 
amendments when the Every Student Succeeds Act came to the Senate floor for further 
debate (Congressional Record). Out of the 115 amendments offered, 38 were actually 
accepted into the first bill that passed the Senate (Congressional Record). Democratic 
Senators on all positions of the political spectrum sponsored some of the bills that the 
chamber accepted. For example, Senator Elizabeth Warren was the second most liberal 
Democrat in the chamber during the 113th Congress according to her DW-NOMINATE 
score on the first dimension of -0.709 (Poole and Rosenthal 2011). Senator Warren 
proposed an amendment that required states to provide assurance regarding the cross-
tabulation of student data and it was agreed to by a voice vote (Congressional Record).  
    Both Senators Alexander and Murray are ideologically near the center of their party in 
the sense that they are not the most moderate, but also not on the ends of the spectrum. 
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Senator Murray has a DW-NOMINATE first dimension score of -0.369 in the 113th 
Congress while Senator Alexander has a score of 0.357  (Poole and Rosenthal 2011). 
This is in comparison to Senator Susan Collins (R-ME) who is a reliably moderate 
Republican and has a DW-NOMINATE first dimension score of 0.106 or Senator Cory 
Booker (D-NJ) who is more strongly liberal with a first dimension ideological score of -
0.498 (Poole and Rosenthal 2011). Senators Alexander and Murray are also about the 
same distance ideologically from the most moderate member of the chamber. This result 
provides evidence for the hypothesis that generally more moderate senators will be likely 
to engage in compromises and that political ideology can influence the effectiveness of 
the minority party in employing this strategy. However, the success of Senator Warren’s 
amendment proves that there is a limit to the impact of political ideology on compromise 
and being more liberal/conservative does not prevent a senator from effectively 
compromising.  
     Also considering the role of seniority on the minority party’s effort to compromise, 
there are mixed results present in this case study. Senator Patty Murray was in her fourth 
term as Senator representing Washington State when she negotiated the Every Student 
Succeeds Act with Senator Alexander who was in his second term. This evidence 
supports the hypothesis that senior senators are more likely to lead or engage in 
compromise negotiations in Senator Murray’s case, but Senator Alexander was more of a 
junior Senator and still was able to foster a compromise. In Senator Murray’s case, her 
previous experience negotiating with Republican members of both chambers gave her a 
reputation in Congress as someone who could foster compromise and work across the 
aisle (Layton 2015). Therefore, it was not Senator Murray’s seniority alone that allowed 
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her to effectively compromise but also the skills she had developed while in the chamber 
and how others in the chamber perceived her that may have contributed. There were 
some freshman senators who effectively used compromise by offering amendments that 
were accepted into the Every Student Succeeds Act. Of the 38 Democratic sponsored 
amendments accepted in the bill, freshman senators sponsored nine of them. This shows 
that freshman minority party senators can also use tools available to engage in 
compromise. However, the ability of freshman senators to successfully sponsor 
amendments effectively just tests one tool that can be used to foster compromise 
providing an opportunity to further study their ability to work with the majority party 
using other sources of power.  
     In this case study, the minority party members used compromise and persuasion as 
strategies to help them achieve their legislative goals. However, they could have instead 
employed obstruction to prevent the majority party from passing any sort of reform to 
NCLB. Previous research suggested that the minority party would obstruct when they 
wanted to prevent the majority from getting a legislative victory or when their own ideas 
were not being considered in the chamber (Strand et al. 2013). Senator Alexander did not 
intend to have a significant amount of Democratic support when he first sponsored the 
bill (Layton 2015). However, he still planned to give all Senators the opportunity to offer 
their own amendments even if the majority party used their voting numbers to block 
those proposals. Therefore, the fact that Democrats could offer amendments and in a way 
participate in the legislative process may have contributed to their decision not to obstruct 
the Every Student Succeeds Act. As Senator Alexander mentioned in his talk about why 
he wanted to reform NCLB, everyone who had anything to do with the United States 
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education system or governance disliked the law and wanted a change (Klein 2016). In 
this case, allowing the Republicans to pass their own reform bill would have provided a 
legislative victory because they could show that they changed a law many hated. Despite 
this fact, the Democrats still chose to work with the Republicans.  
    There are many reasons why the Democrats may have chosen to work with the 
majority rather than block their efforts to reform NCLB. Senator Murray is from 
Washington, which was struggling under the requirements of the law. Washington State 
was actually the first to lose the waiver it received from the Education Department 
because as Education Secretary Duncan said “the state had failed to implement promised 
changes to how it evaluates teachers and principals” (Chokshi 2014). The negative effects 
of NCLB were felt all across the country including in other Democratic Senators’ states. 
A study about conditions that lead the minority party members to compromise found that 
they will work across the aisle when it would negatively effect their reputation to obstruct 
or the issue would further hurt the country if not addressed (Straus et al. 2016, 225). In 
this case, blocking the Every Student Succeeds Act would not have necessarily benefited 
Democrats electorally or generally in the eyes of their constituents because some of their 
constituents wanted the law reformed too.  
 
Case Study 2: Bring Jobs Home Act 
 
     Democratic Senator Debbie Stabenow introduced Senate Bill 3364, also known as the 
Bring Jobs Home Act, in July of 2012. This was the second time Senator Stabenow 
introduced the Bring Jobs Home Act, but the first time it was sent to the Senate Finance 
Committee and was never reported out of the committee for further consideration. 
According to the Congressional Record, the Bring Jobs Home Act would create a new tax 
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credit for businesses that relocated their production back to the United States by 
amending the Internal Revenue Code. The bill would also deny businesses the tax 
deduction they previously received for expenses incurred by outsourcing.  
      Senator Stabenow’s Bring Jobs Home Act was a key legislative priority for the 
Democratic Party and Obama administration leading up to the 2012 presidential and 
congressional elections (Barrett 2012). The Democratic Platform report for the 2012 
election focused on insourcing jobs “so that America can out-build the rest of the world 
again” (Democrat Platform site). There were 15 Democrats in the Senate who 
cosponsored the legislation Senator Stabenow introduced. 
      The Bring Jobs Home Act was filled with proposals from Democrats in the Senate 
who were facing reelection (O'Keefe 2012). Those senators supported the bill to show 
that they were taking steps to address the struggling manufacturing sector in the United 
States (O'Keefe 2012). Senator Stabenow was one of the Democratic senators up for 
reelection and represents Michigan— a state known for its manufacturing industry. 
Members of the Democratic Party argued that 2.4 million jobs had been lost to 
outsourcing over the past ten years because global firms were sending positions to 
markets that were cheaper (O’Keefe 2012). Democrats believed the Bring Jobs Act 
would lessen the incentives for outsourcing and help put Americans back to work (Cox 
2012).  
     Senate Republicans argued that the Democrats only proposed the bill to score political 
points in the current election. Republican Senator Orrin Hatch, ranking member for the 
Senate Finance Committee, said the Bring Jobs Home Act was a joke since it was 
“devoid of serious content because it is product of political rather than economic 
 51 
priorities” (Cox 2012). The Republicans considered supporting the Bring Jobs Home Act, 
but decided against it after Senator Reid refused to include any of the Republican 
amendments offered in the final bill (Cox 2012).  
     A report for the Joint Committee on Taxation showed that the tax credit included in 
the Bring Jobs Home Act would cost the country almost 360 million dollars over 10 
years. The report also estimated that ending the deduction for outsourcing expenses 
corporations incurred would only add 143 million dollars in revenue over 10 years. 
Overall according to the report, the Bring Jobs Home Act would actually reduce 
government revenue by 214 million dollars, further adding to the country’s deficit.  
     Democratic Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid put the Bring Jobs Home Act on the 
legislative calendar for the chamber after Senator Stabenow introduced. Therefore, the 
bill was never considered in the committee process before coming to the Senate floor for 
debate and a vote. When the Bring Jobs Home Act was brought to the floor, Republicans 
proposed amendments the Democrats were unlikely to accept. During a discussion about 
voting on another motion to proceed for the Bring Jobs Home Act, Senator McConnell 
asked Senator Reid if the bill would be open to amendments before the chamber held the 
vote on the motion. Senator Reid responded that the amendments he had seen so far by 
Republicans “have [had] absolutely nothing to do with outsourcing. So unless the 
Republicans get serious about legislating on the legislation we have, the answer would 
be: Very doubtful” (Congressional Record). The three amendments Republican Senators 
had introduced would repeal the Affordable Care Act; reestablish the tax cuts President 
George W. Bush passed, and a tax proposal by Senator Hatch (Congressional Record). 
Senator Reid argued that Senator Hatch’s amendment would remove every provision in 
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the Bring Jobs Home Act that was intended to promote job creation for American 
workers (Congressional Record). The Affordable Care Act was a signature piece of 
legislation for Democrats and the Obama administration (Zorn 2017). Senator Reid said 
he would not allow votes on the three amendments Republican Senators had proposed 
because they were not germane (Barrett 2012).  
      On July 19th, 10 days after Senator Stabenow first introduced the Bring Jobs Home 
Act the Senate held a cloture vote on the motion to proceed debate on the bill. The 
Democrats needed 60 votes to move the Bring Jobs Home Act to the next stage in the 
legislative process, but the final vote was 56 to 42. There were only four Republicans 
who voted for the bill with the rest voting against preventing the Democrats from 




     A majority of the Republicans effectively employed obstruction to prevent the 
Democrats from passing the Bring Jobs Home Act for the second time during the 112th 
Congress. The Republican senators used multiple procedural powers to keep the bill from 
moving through the legislative process and to pursue their own legislative goals. In this 
case, most of the Republican senators voted against the motion to proceed on the bill and 
the final cloture vote to end debate. There were only four Republican Senators who voted 
in support of the cloture on the final motion to proceed that failed temporarily ending 
Democrat efforts to pass the bill.  
     Another tool the Republicans used to oppose the Bring Jobs Home Act was 
sponsoring amendments. There were a total of 12 amendments offered during debate 
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about the bill and Republican senators sponsored nine of the amendments. None of the 
amendments were actually voted on or agreed to by the chamber because the content of 
some of the Republican amendments resulted in Senator Reid preventing votes on them. 
Some Republican senators’ decisions to oppose the Bring Jobs Home Act after their 
amendments were blocked provides evidence to support the hypothesis that the minority 
party will obstruct when their proposals are not considered.  
     The Republicans were also able to effectively employ obstruction to achieve their 
party goals in the Senate by stopping a bill that was a legislative priority for the 
Democrats. Senator Stabenow proposed the Bring Jobs Home Act just four months 
before the presidential and other congressional elections. Passing the bill could have 
benefited the Democrats electorally, especially the Senators because Democrats still 
controlled the Senate while the party lost its majority in the House in the 2010 midterm 
elections, and shown that the Democrats were able to pass a bill through the chamber that 
they argued would create more jobs for Americans. As mentioned in previous research, 
one reason for the minority party not to compromise is that working across the aisle can 
create positive views of the majority party among the electorate, which can make it hard 
to convince people to vote against majority party legislators in the next election (Egar 
2015). Senator Hatch’s comments that the bill lacked detail and was just a political trick 
show that this factor influenced Republicans’ obstruction of the Bring Jobs Home Act 
(Cox 2012). This idea provides evidence for the hypothesis that the minority party is 
likely to pursue obstruction as a strategy specifically on bills that are legislative priorities 
for the majority party.  
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     Republican senators could have compromised with the Democrats to amend and pass 
the Bring Jobs Home Act. Unemployment is an issue that affects people across state lines 
and has impacted constituents in Republican states as well. However, in this case there 
were many factors that influenced the minority party members’ decision to obstruct. One 
factor that may have led the Republicans in this case to obstruct was the Joint Committee 
on Taxation report that showed the bill would negatively impact the United States 
economy by cutting revenues. Also the details of the bill and how it would lead to the 
creation of more jobs was not clear. The Democrats proposed the same Bring Jobs Home 
Act again in 2014 and Howard Gleckman, editor and senior fellow for the nonpartisan 
Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, provided insight on problems he saw with the bill. 
He argued that in some ways the Bring Jobs Home Act rewarded businesses for moving 
back to the United States without providing subsidies or other mechanisms to ensure 
more jobs were actually created for Americans (Gleckman 2014). Although the Bring 
Jobs Home Act may have benefited the country, the lack of detail in the bill as Senator 
Hatch also mentioned and the political motivations for it influenced some Republican 












     The results of this study show the impact of multiple factors on the ability of minority 
party lawmakers to successfully move the bills they sponsor through the various stages of 
the legislative process. In the House, despite expectations, only longer service in the 
chamber and a more moderate political ideology correlates with increases in the 
effectiveness of minority party legislators. In contrast, membership on power committees 
(Appropriations, Rules, and Ways and Means) and classification as a Southern Democrat 
are associated with decreases in a legislator’s overall effectiveness. The decrease in 
effectiveness for legislators with these characteristics may be a result of committee 
service rules and questions of loyalty that often faced Southern Democrats who were not 
consistent in voting for Democratic initiatives (Schneider 2014; Volden and Wiseman 
2009).  
     The results of the qualitative analysis in the Senate suggest that minority party 
strategies are not implemented in isolation, the minority party does not always employ 
the expected tactic in every situation, and the factors I expected to surround the 
successful use of various strategies were not always present. For example, Senator Patty 
Murray employed persuasion in an effort to convince Senator Alexander to work with her 
on the Every Student Succeeds Act before she compromised. Additionally, the 
hypotheses predicted that moderate Senators will be more effective at employing 
compromise and yet Senator Elizabeth Warren, who is more ideologically extreme, still 
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sponsored an amendment that was accepted in the final bill. In the first case study 
previous research would suggest that the minority party not compromise with the 
majority because they do not want to give them a legislative victory (Weisberg and 
Patterson 1998, 125). Yet, the Democrats decided to work with the Republican majority 
on the bill in part because it would have fixed a growing problem with education in the 
country. In contrast, the Republican minority would have been expected to work with the 
Democrats on the Bring Jobs Home Act because unemployment was a serious problem. 
However, they chose to block the bill—a decision influenced by the political 
environment at the time and Senator Reid’s refusal to consider Republican sponsored 
amendments.  
     Overall, this study expands upon previous research that has often analyzed specific 
powers or strategies the minority party uses to engage in the legislative process. In a more 
partisan political climate, it is important to identify the most effective strategies minority 
party members can employ as it is often difficult to work with the majority to get their 
bills considered in the chamber. The results offer insight into the minority party 
legislators who may be more successful in helping the party achieve its legislative goals 
because who employs a strategy can influence its overall effectiveness.  
     Although this current research provides new information about the minority party 
House lawmakers who tend to be more successful at employing persuasion as a strategy, 
future research should also look at the impact of these factors on Senate minority party 
members. Previous research has found that the policymaking environment in the Senate 
is unique and minority party Senators have more of a voice in the development of 
legislation (Jones 1970). However, Jones (1970) conducted the study at a different time 
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politically where there was less partisan polarization and gridlock than is visible in the 
more recent Congresses. Therefore, analyzing the impact of factors such as seniority and 
committee membership on the legislative effectiveness of Senators provides an 
opportunity to see if the results are different because of the unique Senate climate. In 
addition, the qualitative analysis of the Senate minority party can be expanded to the 
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